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"PUBLIC INTEREST, CONVENIENCE. AND NECESSITY":
the Myth of the FCC
Patrick J. McDonough*
Introduction
Broadcasting is an industry which has grown
rapidly in proportion to the technological progress of
the twentieth century. It is considered both a medium
for education, and a perverter of minds; a means to
attain culture, and a 'vast wasteland'; a meaningful
part of our lives, and a 'sea of uninteresting trivia'.
But perhaps more than any of the above, it is a
business---a business which does not sell its product
door-to-door, or in the supermarkets, but, rather, by
its mere existence in the air and its subsequent avail-
ability at the turn of a dial.
The early days of broadcasting brought great
havoc. Sometimes the later days seem no better. But
almost from the beginning, the government has seen the
need for regulation---whether it be for 'public inter-
est, convenience, and necessity', or for the regula-
tion of competition, the vehicle has been at hand. The
Federal Communications Commission has loomed as a
*Second Year Student, Notre Dame Law School;
Co-Director, 1972-1973
Notre Dame Legislative Bureau
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mysterious body of censors in the minds of many:
little old ladies sitting next to TV screens, cutting
out obscene words from talk shows. Of course, this is
ridiculous, but in light of how the FCC conducts its
affairs and spends our money (who knows how much?),
maybe the 'little old ladies' theory is not that far-
fetched.
Confusion over its role has been the characteris-
tic of the FCC from its inception. Vast power now lies
at its finger-tips provided by legislation containing
a wide range of discretionary power. As an independent
agency, it oversees 7,400 radio and television stations
1
which are subject to license renewal every three years.
In practice, however, the "independence" and the "sub-
jection" are acutely paradoxical. There is great
sensitivity to Congressional pressure, especially when
discussion concerns budgets and automatic renewals are
the overriding characteristics.
This article will consist of treatment of the
statutory basis of the FCC, and a general discussion
of the policy arena in which the bureaucracy operates.
Specific areas of the FCC's operation, illuminated by
cases will serve as indication of the bureaucracy as a
whole. The concentration here will be upon broadcast-
ing and related FCC functions. The final product will
be an evaluation of the public policy and predictions
for the future.
1. Regulation: The History and Development
A. Early Development
There was uproar in the scientific world in 1901
when Marconi first used electromagnetic waves to
transmit voices. Great uproar among the public fol-
lowed Fritz Kreisler's opera solo in Carnegie as it
was transmitted over KDKA in Pittsburgh. However,
there was even greater uproar, and not out of aston-
ishment and marvel as before, by 1927, among scien-
tists, public citizens, and government officials over
the plight of broadcasting.
Fierce competition for audiences, furor over the
many quacks and buffoons broadcasting unchecked, and
enormous static and interference stigmatized the in-
dustry. The result was the invocation of the Third
National Radio Conference in 1927, at which Herbert
Hoover proclaimed:
"The whole broadcasting structure is built
upon service to listeners..Broadcasting
must be conducted to meet their demand, and
this necessarily means higher character in
what is transmitted and better quality in
its reproduction to the ears of the listener"'
The Conference's main product was the Radio Act
of 1927, which, in turn, established a 5-man commission
to grant, renew, and revoke licenses.2 After one year,
all authority was to be vested in the Secretary of
Commerce, except that he would have no power to revoke
a license and was to refer applications, renewals, and
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modifications to the commission whenever there was
controversy .3
The Federal Radio Commission, as it was called,
received several extensions of this power from Con-
gress, and consequently remained the holder of all
authority until 1934. These extensions appear to
serve as nullifications of a very strong potential for
territoriality conflict, as discussed by Downs, between
the commission and the Department of Commerce.
B. Middle Development
Initially, we may view the impetus toward regula-
tion as a response by government to the needs and de-
sires of the public---the listeners. However, just as
the major impetus for the Constitutional Convention of
1789 was regulation and control of commerce, the com-
petition and rapid expansion of interstate commerce---
telephone, telegraph, and radio---prompted the Roose-
velt administration to expand the concept of the FRC.
The division of authority, as it appeared on
paper at least, became extinct with the passage of the
Communications Act of 1934. Thus, the Federal Commun-
ications Commission was created before the Secretary
of Commerce exercised any authority whatsoever. Con-
gress appeared to be mindful of potential conflict as
it was careful not to encroach upon the authority of
states. Moreover, regulation was intended only for
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operations which crossed state borders.4 This was in
spite of a 1933 Supreme Court decision, which held
that: "'...state lines do not divide radio waves; reg-
ulation of them, therefore, is appropriate and essen-
tial for efficient use of the radio."5 A similar
opinion was handed down the following year in U.S. v.
Gregg. 6
Thus, it seems that the Court was making policy
and creating power for the FCC; but, looking to the
statutes it will be seen that the statutes were more
than amply broad enough to allow the FCC to act on its
own--- Judicial gloss was merely absorbed as further
support. The FCC seemed reluctant, at first, to assert
its authority, but slowly it began to exert power over
all transmissions. The territoriality conflict poten-
tial in respect to the states was officially ruled
dead in 1944, when the Supreme Court held that attempt-
ed exercise of authority by state agencies in this
field was invalid.
7
2. The Structure of the FCU
The Commission consists of seven commissioners,
appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate, one of whom is designated as Chairman.
8
No more than four may be of the same political party.
The seven are to function as a unit, exercising general
supervision over the work of the agency.9 This
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structure would seem to maximize conflict, something
which is prevalent in regulatory commissions, and in
regulation in general according to Lowi. The Chairman
represents the agency in all legislative matters,
conferences, and communications with other governmental
offices, departments, or agencies, and generally coor-
dinates and organizes the work of the Commission.
1 0
The Commission was a compartmentalized organiza-
tion until 1937, when this characteristic was deemed
unsatisfactory.1l  The areas of broadcast, telephone,
and telegraph had two commissioners each, with the
Chairman being the third member of each division.
1 2
This resulted in varied workloads, and thus varied re-
sponsibility. The competency of the commissioners in
the area assigned was often limited, and especially so
with the Chairman who sat on three divisions' decision-
making sessions.
A reorganization attempt was begun in 1937 with
an aim toward unit operation where each commissioner
was to have a voice in policy determination.1 3 The
staff level at this time consisted of only four de-
partments. This system was found to be inefficient
also, as it was observed that no one below the seven
commissioners was in a position to coordinate and di-
rect the daily work of the Commission effectively.
14
Thus, the next reorganization attempt was to gear
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toward achieving more economical and efficient opera-
tion through reorganization of the staff.
Selection of commissioners and staff members in
general provides a choice between two sets of values:
1) according to specialized knowledge or skill; and 2)
according to industry to be regulated.15  There are,
indeed, dangers with both of these alternatives---
some of which blatantly are reflected in the FCC from
time to time. Under the first basis, excessive costs
will surely ensue, but there is the assurance that the
decision-making will be done properly, with full dis-
16
closure of important considerations. The second
possesses the danger that staff members will prejudice
decisions by failure to make known all the information
and points of view which ought to be considered.1 7
The Hoover Commission of 1949 recommended the second.
This eventually gained acceptance, largely through the
attacks by Congress on the "permissive decisional or-
ganization"1 8 and the great backlog of cases. Congress
saw three bureaus within the FCC, acting independently
with jealousy and dictatorial control over the expedi-
tion of cases.
1 9
If the Senate's observation was valid, it would
seem that bias was being brought into the decision-
making process causing a limitation in organizational
efficiency. On the basis of Downs' characterizations,
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it would appear that self-interest was riding high---
climbers and/or conservers were ruling. Since the
Commission was 17 years old at that time, the logical
conclusion with respect to Downs' theories is that
conservers were running the show in the FCC.
Both houses urging change, the FCC began to adapt
to a system whereby integrated bureaus were to func-
tion on the basis of the Commission's principal work-
load operation and other divisional organizations were
to be formed that the FCC deemed necessary.20 A "re-
view staff" was formed to assist in preparation of
summaries of evidence. The sum effect of the reorgan-
ization was greater flexibility in the delegation of
authority---functions could now be delegated whenever
necessary to employees, as well as to commissioners.
3. The Broadcast Bureau
The Broadcast Bureau of the FCC, the bureau with-
in the agency most concerned with in this paper, con-
sists of the Office of the Chief and eight divisions:
Broadcast Facilities; Renewal and Transfer; Complaints
and Compliance; Rules and Standards; Economics;
License; Hearing; and Network Study.21 The Bureau is
served constantly by the Office of Hearing Examiners
of the FCC which provides for appointment of hearing
examiners, who, in turn, preside over adjudicatory
proceedings. 22 The Chief Hearing Examiner is the
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liaison for the FCC and the Examiners in securing ad-
vice and information from outside sources concerning
the improvement of administrative procedures, and he
recommends changes in rules to simplify and expedite
the conduct of hearings.
2 3
The Offices of the General Counsel and the Chief
Engineer are among the most important in the decision-
making process information-gathering. The former
cooperates with other officers in sending advice with
respect to rule-making matters and proceedings affect-
ing more than one bureau in the Commission; he is also
in charge of litigation and advises on proposed legis-
lation. 4 The latter, who works with the Counsel when
the jurisdictions of two or more bureaus are involved,
advises and represents the FCC in the allocation of
radio frequencies. 25  In addition, the Broadcast
Bureau works in conjunction with the more functional
departments: Office of Administration; Secretary; and
the Office of Reports and Information which generally
deal with the housekeeping chores of the FCC.
It is obvious, then, that the funneling of in-
formation is designed for maximum cooperation among
the various offices involved in the decision-making
process. Of the above-mentioned FCC staff, the fol-
lowing are deemed "decision-making personnel": Com-
missioners; Chief of the Office of Opinions and Review;
Review Board; Chief Hearing Examiner; General Counsel;
Chief Engineer; and their respective staffs.
2 6 More-
over, the FCC appears somewhat unique in that its
internal rules denote specifically who is to make de-
cisions.
4. The Authority of the FCC
The totality of the powers of the FCC are best
summarized in the following memo by Joel Rosenbloom:
1. The Communications Act of 1934 .... authorizes
the FCC to classify broadcasting stations on
the basis of the general types of programs such
stations transmit, to make reasonable judgments
as to the public interest served by the programs
offered by each class of stations, and to assign
radio frequencies...
2. (The) Act authorizes the Commission to consider
the nature and content of the programs pro-
posed to be broadcast by individual applicants
in deciding whether to grant, construction
permits or station licenses...authorizes Com-
mission to consider the general nature and
content of the programs which have been broad-
cast in deciding whether to renew, modify or
revoke broadcasting station permits or licenses,
whether to consent to the assignment of the
same or to consent to the transfer of the con-
trol of broadcasting permittees or licensees.
3. (The) Act forbids the Commission to censor,
i.e. to prevent the broadcasting of any indi-
vidual program on the ground that its content
is objectionable. It also forbids the Commis-
sion to select broadcasting licensees on the
basis of the social, political, or economic
views embodied in their programs .... However,
the Act both permits and requires the Commission
to make reasonable judgments as to the nature
of the broadcasting program service which
serves the public interest and to carry out its
licensing functions on the basis of such judg-
ments.27
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Most of the powers of the FCC are in licensing.
The Act provides for the granting of construction
permits, as well as station licenses, and the FCC will
determine who gets these on the basis of applications
setting forth such things as: citizenship character;
financial and technical qualifications; proposed fre-
quency; power; hours of operation; and purposes for
which station is to be used (i.e., type of program-
ming). Thus, the broad range of discretionary power
is evident in the policy-making process.
All licensing power and authority generally re-
lated to broadcasting is based upon the notion that
the public owns the airwaves (the broadcast channels),
and stations are allowed to use them with a waiver of
control in deference to the FCC.2
8
A. Purpose of the Policy
The general purpose of the policies of the FCC is
to prevent chaos and insure satisfactory service as is
understood under the "public interest, convenience,
and necessity" standard of 93 01 of the Communications
Act. A general aim is stated in §303: "fair, effi-
cient, and equitable distribution of radio service."
However, as early as 1931, during the days of the old
FRC, the notion that independent regulatory agencies
actually regulate competition and not simply for the
consumer's benefit can be seen developing in a Supreme
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Court case holding: "...it is in the interest of the
public and common justice to the owner that the status
of broadcasting station be constructed and maintained
in good faith, and should not be injuriously affected
except for compelling reasons."2 9
Thus, it appears that the drift from concern only
with public interest to the "compelling reason" stand-
ard may have been an oaen for the future. This notion
is further supported by 9326, which deals with censor-
ship (supra at 7).3 0 This section indicates Congress'
desire to restrict the FCC's power---but actually, this
is the only place in the Act where there is a definite
restriction on its authority. Theoretically, this
section could be circumvented, and is at times, in
that the FCC views past performance in handing out re-
newals; it determines whether the station's operation
has been in the "public interest."
In simplest terms, the FCC has regulatory power
with respect to any type of radio transmission and can
require every station, regardless of its power or
range, to have a license and to operate under the rules
of the Commission.31 The FCC more than regulates
traffic. The Court has held that it holds the burden
of determining composition of traffic.3 2 This, in ef-
fect, amounts to the authority to evaluate past program
performance in respect to consideration of renewal
applications as set out in the Act itself.
What has been developed here is the responsibilily
factor which Downs holds as fundamental to bureau-
cratic policy-making. The factor is large, indeed, in
the FCC. In addition to what the Court has held and
the "public interest, etc." standard of 9301, the im-
pact of radio-TV is immense. They are vital communi-
cations media for the social, cultural, and political
development of our people---the responsibility of the
FCC in this regard is greater than any other govern-
ment agency or department.
3 3
At this point, it would be well to set a pattern.
In order to gain an insight into some of the nuances
of policy-making in the FCC, licensing will be focussed
on as an illustration. This will be followed by a dis-
cussion as to the legitimacy of the regulatory process.
And, finally, an evaluation will be made as to whether
the "public interest, etc." are really served.
B. Licensing
Discretion provided the FCC by the Act is great
in the area of licensing, especially in regard to de-
termining minimum qualifications. For example, under
the heading of "technical qualifications," there are
included staffing, studio, and equipment plans.3 4 The
general requirement is that they, "...must be adequate
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to effectuate to a reasonable degree the programs
(the station) has promised".3 5 "Reasonable" is de-
fined nowhere within the Act---its determination is
entirely within the discretion of the FCC. Another
example is the character qualifications: honesty, re-
liability, moral, financial and social responsibil-
ity.3 6 Again, the FCC alone determines the breadth of
meaning.
An example of application of this discretion bears
on the above policy. A newspaper applicant was denied
a license for a past attempt to coerce advertising
contracts. 3 7 No law was actually violated. But in the
FCU's discretion, that was immaterial---it was enough
that behavior standards of an applicant in business
affairs and dealings with the public raise serious
questions as to his ability to meet the requirements
of a broadcast license.3 8 itSerious" is, of course,
within the discretion of the FCC.
Moreover, as typical examples of use of discre-
tion by the FCC, show there are no hard and fast rules
as to qualifications nor for application of the stand-
ards. In this respect, the FCC resembles the neutral
competency category discussed by Kaufman: generally
there is the overriding aim of "public interest"; the
approach is a case by case method, as epitomized in
licensing---totally ad hoc; and in the absence of
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hypothetical rule-making there appears an abundance of
administrative rule-making, common to that category.
Generally speaking, the burden of proof is upon
the applicant.3 9 The FCC, in choosing contenders,
tends to prefer stations which are to be owned and
controlled by persons living in the community where
the station is operating.4 0 Experience in the broad-
cast field is also viewed as an important aspect of
qualifications in deciding between applicants.4 1 Pro-
gramming itself is an important element; he who serves
particular needs and interests in the particular area
in which station will operate, ideally, also is to be
favored. "Need", as seen by the FCC, encompasses the
following: news; issue programs; community religious
and educational shows; etc.4 2 Therefore, necessarily,
environment is a factor in the decision-making pro-
cess. Live programming is seen as very important. Of
even more significance is the content and promise of
implementation of the proposal which the applicant
makes.43
Despite all the factors and considerations men-
tioned above, there is no general rule as to who gets
licenses and who does not. The policy which results
is simply the product of the FCC acting over a course
of years. Usually, preferential treatment is given to
cultural, educational, issue, talk shows, followed by
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stations which offer diversified programming. This
may not be definitive either, as even Newton Minow,
ex-Chairman of the FCC, questioned the relevance of
the policy as the ratings show that a substantial num-
ber of people prefer old movies to public affairs.4
Further, it might easily be predicted that in sub-
standard socioeconomic-educational areas, entertain-
ment and sports events would be most desired, and con-
sequently, an attempt to stress the programming men-
tioned above there, would result in a great deal of
channel-changing.
Through past decisions, a process has developed
in one area of licensing which serves as an excellent
example of discretionary power, ad hoc policy-making,
and lack of specific limitations of power, to sum up
the area of licensing. This area is "ownership." At
the present time, one cannot own more than 7 AM sta-
tions, 7 FM's, 5 VHF's, and 2 UHF's.4 5 There does not
appear to be that much of a restriction in respect to
pure numbers.
The policy aims of the FCC in the area of ownership
are to preclude concentration of control of mass media,
and to obtain the greatest possible diversity of pro-
gramming, sources, and viewpoints among the many sta-
tions.4 6 Here, again, there are no specific rules---
FCC policy impedes concentration and induces diversity
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as provisions are designed to maximize competition
among broadcasters.4 7 Of course, the actions are
guided to an extent by the Act4 8, and also supported
by the courts, which have held that broadcasting should
best exist as a business of free competition.4 9 How-
ever, neither has hindered the FCC in its discretion.
Generally, in regard to multiple ownership, the
FCC's philosophy appears to be that it believes that
the better method of creating diversity of viewpoints
in an area, is to grant the broadcast authorizations
to as many separate owners as possible.5 0 The FCC has
not yet established a definite rule prohibiting, for
example, newspaper ownership of broadcast facilities---
nevertheless, application of its philosophy in the
policy-making process would necessarily preclude such.
In the ad hoc case by case analysis of applications,
comparisons are made between the paper applying and
other papers, as well as other applicants.
5 1
There appears to be unbridled discretion in this
specific case of newspaper applications. Cases go both
ways. An t-pplicant having no newspaper interests is
ordinarily preferred over one who controls, say, the
only newspaper in the community, but these circum-
stances of ownership alone, do not necessarily exclude
one in light of past decisions.5 2 All considerations
as to determine as to which applicant will serve the
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public interest are supposed to be weighed. Where
equally qualified, the FCC will usually go with the
non-owner.
5 3 It might be inferred logically that the
FCC prefers moderate concentration of control of
broadcast facilities to a combination of broadcast and
newspaper ownership in light of previous cases, and
the FCC's own staif£rdof "experience" as a factor in
selection of applicants. Indeed, a fine line is
created here.
Within the multiple ownership area, then, it
appears that the FCC does not favor a grant to an ap-
plicant where it may tend to constrict or control the
dissemination of information in the area.5 4 In a com-
parative hearing, evidence that one applicant owns
other broadcast facilities or a newspaper may be the
'kiss of death', but not necessarily, since it depends
upon an enormous number of factors entirely within the
FCC's discretion.
These decisions reflect both quantitative and
qualitative comparisons. They are, indeed, the type
that Lindblom would categorize as "rational-compre-
hensive" (root), despite the element of successive
comparisons, which is often indicative of the 'branch'
method. The reason for this analysis is contained in
the fact that the ends are set forth prior to the
decision---there results an end-means analysis
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throughout the mechanism of comparison. The test of
"good" policy is generally that shown to be most
appropriate or convenient means of the desired end, as
evidenced by the fact that cases goboth ways here.
5. Justification for the Authority of the FCC
A brief mention of the FCC's statutory authority
was made earlier. Some of the policy-making of the
agency has also been demonstrated. The connection be-
tween these two areas comes in many forms of Justifi-
cation and legitimization. Vague statements such as
the following often serve to explain the authority:
"The Commission has the legislative authority
to take actions, make rules and regulations,
and issue orders, not contrary to law, as may
be necessary to carry out its functions and
may conduct proceedings in a manner as will
best conduce proper dispatch of business an4
to the ends of justice." (Emphasis added),-
In addition to being void of substantive meaning, a
statement such as the above appears humourous. What is
really being said is that the FCC has enormous breadth
in discretionary power.
Licensing has been the subject of the expression
of pre-determined goals in the form of vagaries. A
July, 1960 policy statement on programming, indicating
root decision-making, is a prime example:
"The principal ingredient of the licensee's
obligation to operate his station in the public'
interest is the diligent, positive, and con-
tinuing effort...to discover and fulfill the
tastes needs, and desires of his---service
area."56
Viewing the enormous discretion and vagaries of
language, questions are raised. How far can the FCC
really go? Is the FCC utilizing legislative authority
as it appears? Has Congress delegated unconstitution-
ally, power to the FCC? Are there any effective checks
by the three 'official' branches of government? These
questions have been answered to a certain extent pre-
viously. However, it would be well to approach them
in more depth from the perspective of the Executive,
the Legislative, and the Judicial and their relation
to the FCC.
The only statutory provision relating directly to
the President in the area of checking the operation of
broadcasting is §606, which deals with emergency powers
in time of war and national disaster. Of course, the
President appoints the Commissioners within the guide-
lines noted previously, and he will obviously search
for those who possess his philosophy. But direct con-
tact from the day of appointment is minimal. The best
case in point is the appointment of Nicholas Johnson in
1966 by President Johnson. The appointment was, in-
deed, for faithful service to LBJ, but Johnson soon
proved that he was his own man in the FCC. The advent
of the Nixon administration, and especially the ap-
pointment of Dean Burch to the Commission, brought
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Johnson no closer to the Executive. In fact, he pub-
licly scored Nixon for clearing Burch's appointment
with the "great men' of broadcasting before announcing
it. 5 7
Congress, on the other hand, has retained an ele-
ment of control in the FCC despite having given
enormous discretionary power. Indeed, this is not
"official control"...it is more one-on-one. Congress-
men seek to please their constituents; thus, they may
speak to the FCC in the latter's behalf. Inevitably,
the constituency contains broadcasters...sometimes in-
fluential, powerful and wealthy broadcasters. Members
of Congress more easily come in contact with the broad-
casters than they do with private citizens, and they
very easily come in contact with the FCC. The result
on FCC policy is a certain degree of negation of inde-
pendence. It becomes 'independent' to transmit what
Congressmen and itself come to terms on. Examples of
what transpires when they do not come to terms are the
delay of the FCC Revised Program Policy in 1960 by
pro-broadcaster Congressmen5 8 , and the defeat of a 1961
reorganization proposal by a broadcast lobby5 9 .
There are also official connections between Con-
gress and the FCC in the form of investigatory hearings
and action on legislation. However, the FCC essenti-
ally responds on the level of finance.
"The House Commerce Committee and its com-
munications subcommittee habitually meddle
into FCC policy matters at the behest of the
beoadcasting industry. The Committee has
initial legislative jurisdiction in the House
over the FCC..."60
That which occurs at the committee level of Congress
deals largely with "who pays?" and "how much?" Here,
Kohlmeir's notion of individual involvement and in-
fluence takes form. He comments that "... over 24 Con-
gressmen are known to have personal interests in
broadcasting stations..." 61  It is a well-known princi-
ple that those Congressmen who control the purse
strings stand first in line for the bestowal of gifts.
For example, Kohlmeir points out that Senator Magnuson
never had to ask for favors from the FCC.. .his company
simply received licenses automatically.6 2 This inter-
twining and entanglement of the FCC with Congress,
makes obvious the potential for a check on the FCC's
discretion by Congress. The effect of such is not
always good.
The courts, not really being technically equipped
to concern themselves with the FCC, havegenerally ad-
hered to a "hands-off" attitude. The FCC, on the other
hand, has suggested that clarification by the courts of
the doubt as to Constitutional limitation on the Com-
mission's power to consider programming would aid the
FCC in the administration of the Uommunications Act. 63
The result is somewhat of a stalemate. In some cases,
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the FCC does not formulate rules, largely due to the
lack of court opinion in certain areas.64 For example
a law which provides potential punishment of 2 years
imprisonment or a $10,000 fine for obscene or indecent
language by means of radio communication , has never
been drawn into an FCC rule because of the above rea-
son.
However, the courts, upon application of the Attor-
ney General, may issue writs of mandamus commanding
compliance with provisions of FCC rules as stated in
the statutes.6 6 With respect to the FCC's own policy-
making, there is some conflict. The Supreme Court has
generally adhered to the notion of an innate lack of
spectrum space to be passed out in licensing67 as jus-
tification for any FCC regulation. The Court also has
clarified its own position with the FCC:
"Congress has charged courts with responsi-
bility of saying whether the Commission has
fairly exercised its discretion within the
vague bounds expresggd by the standard of
'public interest '".9
It is interesting that even the Court has taken note
of the vagueness of FCC policy-making standards.
Consideration of the Fairness Doctrine, 1315 of
the Act, may give some insight into one area regulated
by the FCC, that permits a judgment as to whether the
Commission is exercising legislative power. On its
face, of course, any such delegation would be
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unconstitutional, but the breadth and sweeping quality
of discretionary authority under the Act does not, per
se, include Congressional powers. The Fairness Doc-
trine requires that, when a partisan position is ex-
pressed over a station, a reasonable opportunity must
be afforded opponents of the view to present their
side. 6 9 It also requires that when an editorial
attacks one by name, there must be communication to him
of a copy of the editorial, prior to, or at the time
of broadcast.7 0 No station is obligated to carry po-
litical broadcasting, but it must afford equal oppor-
tunity to all 'legally qualified candidates' in cam-
paigns.
Does this infringe upon First Amendment rights of
freedom of speech by press? The Court has held:
"Commentators and newsmen who criticize
public officials, whether by 'editorial
opinion' or by paid commercial, cannot be
suedfor libel, provided malice is not proven."
7 1
Moreover, it would appear that radio and TV are pro-
tected. But the Court, again playing in the scarcity
of spectrum space held in the famous Red Lion case,
that:
"In view of the prevalence of scarcity of
broadcast frequencies, the Government's role
in allocating those frequencies, and the
legitimate claims of those unable to gain
access to them for the expression of their
views.. .the regulations promulgated by the
Fairness Doctrine are both authorized by
statute and constitutional."72
Meanwhile, the FCC's developed policy is that
licensees have responsibility to present and encourage
opposing views; more affirmative effort is required
when the station, itself, is editorializing. 73 Thus,
somewhere in the grey area between the First Amendment
and the justifiable aim of the FCC to afford as wide a
dissemination of viewpoints, lies the Fairness Doc-
trine.
6. Impact of FCC Policy
The FCC holds as its chief concern the overall
operation of stations, measured in terms of local
"needs", and not individual programs or particular
formats, or the way they are presented.74  Thus, on
the last count, broadcasters are given a wide range of
discretion. Pursuing this end is one of the newest
divisions of the FCC, Complaints and Compliance, estab-
lished in 1960 in the Broadcast Bureau. It deals with
complaints regarding radio and TV programming, and
assists in the overall evaluation of station operations
at renewal of license time. 7 5 Despite this innovation
and the wealth of policy-making, it has been reported
that within the FCC, 95% of the staff feel that broad-
casters are no nearer the established goals than they
were 20 years ago.76
Beginning with 1960, the FCC stressed heavily
that it was the duty of the broadcaster to determine
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needs, desires, and tastes of listeners and viewers in
order to meet the public interest responsibility.
77
However, certain types of programming have come under
official disfavor, e.g., liquor ads, medical treatment
prescriptions, racial and religious attacks, and the
like.
7 8
This area of FCC policy is paradoxical: public
interest is determined with no direct public input
into the policy-making process. All the information
pertinent to maintaining standards is gathered by those
who are regulated. The information is then directed
to the FCC, where it is used in comparative hearings
on original grants or in license renewal proceedings
to determine whether the public interest standard and
the balanced program doctrine are met.7 9 We thus de-
pend on the good faith of the broadcaster, ultimately,
for the factual basis for decision-making.
Moreover, the results reflect a high potential of
failure on "needs-desires"criterion, as mentioned be-
fore (supra p.202), and as Nicholas Johnson states:
1'Citizen participation in the FCC's decision-making
processes is virtually non-existent.. .the FCC is a
captive of the very industry it is purportedly trying
to regulate80
One of the greatest weaknesses of the FCC has
been its undaunted adherence to the case-by-case
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approach in deoision-making. The FuC maintains that
public interest is always considered fully, and that
any change should be accomplished only through pro-
posed rule-making.8 1 Public interest considerations,
as noted above, vis-a-vis the citizenry and the stumbl-
ling block of 'pro-broadcastism' in Congress causes
one result: a lack of effectiveness in many areas.
Looking to the complex and confusing area of
multiple ownership of broadcast facilities, once again
as an example, supports the prior conclusion. Despite
FCC "policy" against such, the top 10 markets, which
include 40% of all TV households ( 20 million), have
40 VHF stations, of which 37 are multiply owned and
the remaining three are owned by newspapers!8 2  Of the
top 50 markets, 75% of TV households, 111 of the 156
VHF stations are multiply owned, with the remaining 45
being owned by papers:83
Proposed rule-making to limit the number of sta-
tions in the top 50 markets was advanced in 1965, and
little resulted until early 1969 when the FCC refused
renewal of IWHDH, Channel 5, in Boston.84 This cele-
brated case, involving the TV station and the Boston
Herald-Traveller, resulted in the allocating of a
license to an independent group in a fit of unexpected
activism in the FCC. 8 5  This occurred within one year
of an open advocation of the FCC's abolition by a
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Commissioner--a period of great despondency in the FCC
and the height of rubber-stampingl86 VIHDH was not
judged to have failed in its duties as a broadcaster,
although there was some quibbling over the lack of
agricultural programming8 7 (a strange topic, indeed,
for Bostoniansl). Rather, the FCC took away the li-
cense primarily to encourage diversification of owner-
88
ship. Such cases virtually never occur because of
the Commission's traditional policy of treating licen-
see's past performance as automatic evidence of super-
ior future performance,8 9 (hence, the result of in-
formation-gathering performed by the regulated).
The reaction of Congress, let alone the broadcast
industry, was something to behold. Congress urged the
National Association of Broadcasters to prohibit the
FCC from allowing competing applications for licenses,
unless the original holder was found to be acting con-
trary to the public interest.9 0 Meanwhile, Nicholas
Johnson was defending the FCC's action by citing the
market statistics, and stating: 'The door has thus
been opened for local citizens to challenge media
giants in their local community at renewal time with
some hope of success."91 However, Congressional action
closed that 'door' by passing legislation from among
numerous bills which makes it vitually impossible for
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one to challenge a present holder while applying for
a license.
9 2
Many held, and still hold that there are too many
stations, and that decisions such as WHDH are neces-
sary. Competition does not necessarily improve program
quality; where there are a reasonable number of li-
censes in a market, the services are generally super-
ior.9 3 The market for broadcast programs is one from
which the consumer is barred: what he would pay plays
no part in determination of programs.9 4 This is large-
ly the basis for the arguments for the increase of
development of pay-TV. However, the FCC's trace of
activism has not carried over from WHDH, and has been
cool to the idea, maintaining narrow restrictions
under the auspices of a special bureau devoted to cable
TV.
Extensive regulatory power generates a certain
fear of bureaucracy that frequently makes administra-
tive adjudication unbalanced.95 Kohlmeir sees the FCC
as fulfilling its role through the maximum use of dis-
cretionary power in a quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative
manner. Though the FCC has no particular power to
compel programming of a certain nature, it may gener-
ally approach the matter through license renewal, and
thereby attain its goals. This is where the height of
inconsistency is reached in the FCC.
The possibility of criminal action, under such
things as the obscenity law, would surely be suffi-
cient to cause broadcasters to obey. However, the FCC
is one of the weakest agencies in applying sanctions
which profoundly affect the exercise of its judicial
functions. When commissioners fail to agree, station
96
owners and networks can and do ignore the FCC. Al-
though the FCC frequently threatens action and dire
consequences, more often than not the threat comes
from a minority of conmiissioners. 97 When the Commis-
sion is united, however, its sanctions are impressive,
for example, WHDH.
Until 1960, the FCC's only recourse for rule vio-
lations was the institution of proceedings for the
revocation of licenses.98 This 'death-sentence' was
seen to be inequitable for minor violations, requiring
much time and money to be expended in formal hearings,
and was generally considered as one to be avoided by
the Commission, no matter what the violation. There
are now a rapidly growing number of penalties, for-
feitures, and cease and desist powers available to the
FCC. 9 9 However, many observers, including Kohlmeir,
charge that the FCC, and independent regulatory agen-
cies in general, are geared toward the regulation of
competition. Tracing the FCC to the earliest days,
it was seen that public interest was not the primary
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impetus for its inception (supra, p.191, rather the
intention was to serve expanding competition for the
benefit of the industry. The vagaries of the 'public
interest, etc." standard, and specific events such as
'Nicholas Johnson's door closing', support this notion.
Indeed, the FUC is prime example of a supposed
public agency engaged in private planning. Davis would
call for a renewal of openness as a cure for the lack
of public representation in policy-making.
7. Lowi and the FCC
Conflict would seem to be the essence of a regu-
latory agency such as the FCC in developing regulatory
public policy. Spocific benefits and specific costs,
with conflict at the heart of the process resulting in
a great deal of open bargaining are the characteris-
tics of the second category of Lowils public policy-
making analysis. Those qualities are not found, how-
ever, in the FCC. Dealings there are largely behind
the scenes---there is no public input into the pro-
cess. Benefits are general in theory, and in practice
are geared along vague standards. And most signifi-
cantly, conflict is muted by Congressional and indus-
trial pressures exercised upon the FCC's operation.
There is substantial backing-off, and only occasional
holding of ground in conflict.
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The lack of conflict is not by design, nor is it
universal in the FCC as is characteristic in purely
distributive policy-making. However, results of
policy-making show narrowly distributed benefits in
actual practice and widely distributed costs---the in-
dustry and the public, respectively. This is, indeed,
characteristic of Lowi's first category. The FCC is
not engaged in purely "porkbarrel" decision-making
directly, but it often aids cronies of Congressmen,
and there are losers in this game: the general pub-
lic.
Class politics are the model of redistributive
politics in Lowi's third category. A conflict of
elites is theorized to occur in this type of public
policy-making, and, indeed, the FCC officials, Con-
gressmen, and industrial leaders seem to form a holy
triumvirate worthy of the redistributive label. In
addition, the FCC designedly, by statute at least, is
aimed at a reshuffling of valuable commodities in
society, namely: licenses and permits for the use of
spectrum space.
Utilizing "coercion" as a guide in viewing Lowi's
scheme of categories, varied conclusions regarding the
FCC are possible. The likelihood of coercion is gen-
erally remote in view of the lack of consistent united
decisions by the commissioners and the political games
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with Congress and its committees. But the applica-
bility of what little coercion there is, is both
specific and general. Dictates from the FCC are pri-
marily aimed at the entire industry; violations of
them, however, are met with sanctions on a station by
station basis. The former indicates a constituent
policy, the latter, distributive policy. Indeed,
since the FCC rarely responds to the public, one won-
ders if the constituency is not the industry itself.
It seems that when the likelihood of coercion is
balanced with the likelihood of peaceful adjustment,
the FCC seems to fall into the category termed "dead-
lock." This is keyed to the fact that the FCC's
decisions are inconsistent with its statutory power,
and, again, rarely unanimous. The public policy re-
sulting thus appears to be distributive.
Viewing particular characteristics of the FCC with
respect to the three categories and their general
characteristics, it can be seen that variance abounds,
in theory, but not so much in practice. Standards of
jurisdiction (scope of authority) varies from specific
to vague in the statutes. Sanctions are very specific,
as is procedural implementation. This would seem to
indicate regulatory public policy, or even redistribu-
tive, in light of the valuables being passed out. But
it must be remembered that there are not many
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valuables left---i.e., spectrum space has largely been
consumed. In addition, there are not many WHDH cases
resulting in redistribution of licenses. Further,
since coercion in actual practice is, at best, fairly
unlikely, the specificity of the regulatory and redis-
tributive categories is out of step with reality.
Moreover, the scope of authority inherently af-
fords enormous discretion---a loose standard has
evolved. Implementation, directly affected by the
discretionary power, is characterized by nebulous
policy statements and justifications, resulting in
selective application of authority---a vague standard.
For example, to illustrate the two preceding state-
ments, the Communications Act provides that stations
must keep program logs 1 00 , but the FCC has never pro-
mulgated a standard as regard to the format of the
logs.1 0 1 Indeed, sanctions are specific when utilized,
but are rarely implemented. The same is true regard-
ing procedural implementation---the result being the
effect of no sanctions and entirely administrative
rule-making. And the last consideration, scope of
statutory coverage, lends itself to the others and is
dominated by discretionary power--vague as to its
actual application.
The conclusion with respect to Lowi's categories:
the FCC public policy-making is largely distributive.
8. Same Time, Same Station?
As Ronald H. Couse has said:
"We cannot expect a regulatory commission to
act in the public interest, particularly if
we have regard to its actions over the long
period...their (the commissions') views are
liable to be in tune with those who have
political power. "102
This implies what Kohlmeir believes: That the regula-
tory agencies, the FCC included, look at problems in
industry terms. It is evident that it is not what the
public wants that is transmitted through the airwaves,
rather it is what the public authority wants. The
latter can be traced back to the industry---it is they
who gather the information.
Couse predicts:
"Broadcasting is likely to continue as a de-
centralized system, operated in the main by
private enterprise. What programs will be
broadcast will, therefore, be determined by
the economics of the industry.. .programs...
will be those most profitable to broadcast."l 0 3
And the New Republic has said:
"The commercial broadcasting system (under the
pretense of giving the people what they want)
drowns (the people) in a sea of trivia and
not very interesting trivia at that."116 4
Is the situation hopeless? Is TV destined to be
merely a vehicle for old movies, and radio for 'moldy-
oldies'? Some have despaired, but others have not, in-
cluding Couse.
"We should accept and use the fact that busi-
nessmen maximize profits--we must devise
institutional arrangements to lead business-
men to do what is desirable by making it
profitable for them to do so."105
Viewing the FCC in its conserver top-heaviness, one
wonders if the self-interest will not win out. Com-
missioner Johnson often finds himself refused on sug-
gestions by the agency staff; they, in turn, find
themselves referred to as inadequate, as many cor-
plaints are totally ignored.106
On the other hand, there are times when the FCC
acts against stations (obviously, those without key
friends in Congress) for picayune things. For example,
Robert Shayon raises the question:
"Is the FCC acting in the public interest when
it proposes to fine an educational broadcaster
for allowing certain Anglo-Saxon, four-letter
words aired during a taped interview with the
leader of a rock music group?"107
The FCC's argument that millions will be offended and,
subsequently, will stop using their radios and TV's
is patently weak. 
1 0 8
Many policies which appear good on the surface,
but which often are near shams in reality, will con-
tinue. For example, it is highly unlikely that the
FCC will change its outward approach to multiple own-
ership. However, the case-by-case approach will con-
tinue, also. Intervening Congressmen and insecure
bureaucrats will engage in molding foundations with
respect to decisions. The bureaucrat, uncomfortable
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at having to exercise his authority, will seek to
placate as many interests as possible.10 9 Indeed, the
multi-million dollar licenses, dealt with in this con-
text, indicate where the strongest and most placated
interest lies: politicians. The result will thus be
an entrenching of the statistics concerning the top
markets with respect to multiple ownership, and a sig-
nal of the FCC's decision-making in general: private
planning.
Perhaps, the only reason why there is not a caltua-
itous situation comparable to the 1950's, when most
existing licenses were first handed out on a case-by-
case basis, is the fact that-there are few allocations
possible. The VHF space is virtually used up. UHF, on
the other hand, has been held under wraps by the FCC.
The reservation of such unused space, to many, repre-
sents a waste of frequencies and a denial to business
and industry of a useful production tool.ll0 There is
also evidence that the practice has tended to discour-
age research looking toward broader and more efficient
use of the spectrum.1l l  Couse assesses the ad hoc
method of allocation:
"The major resource used in the radio indus-
try, the radio frequency spectrum, is carried
out by a method which is inefficient, in-
equitable, and inflexible."l12
Kohlmeir generally agrees with this idea, and goes
further by saying that the FCC would have avoided many
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of the problems by utilizing a "demand" method1 1 3 in
deciding who should get stations and where they should
be.
Some have placed the blame for the FCC's muddle,
not upon the method of decision-making, as it should
be, but rather, upon Congress. They hold that Congress
has not given the FCC sufficient guidelines to act.
It is more than this, however---there is a composite
of factors in the decision-making process:
" The FCC is exercising a judicial function
for it is deciding a relatively specific case
involving a limited number of parties on the
basis of its own regulations, plus such re-
quirements as Congress may have written into
law. "14
This quasi-judicial procedure---a product of private
planning---rarely shows signs of breaking. The reac-
tion to WHDH by Congress, et al., was enough to send
second-rate bureaucrats scurrying, and first-raters
toward making amends. Louis Jaffe sums the situation
up, thusly:
"Regulation assumes legislative determination
only of policy conflicts, with a resulting
firm declaration of the regulatory principles
to be applied; a grant of sufficient discretion
to find the best ways and means to adapt poli-
cies to a constantly developing situation, and
a well-informed, imaginative, disinterested
bureaucracy operating in a judicial spirit."ll5
(emphasis added)
This is not the FCC.
There is a need for the FCC to respond to the
needs of the people---not through information garnered
by the industry, but directly, from the people to the
Commission. For example the New Republic finds that
TV needs new voices, more creativity, greater diver-
sity "in order to refresh a bored society. "ll6  Con-
gress, however, is seen to accept the broadcasters'
contention that all's well and no newcomers need
apply.1 1 7 Pay TV and CATV are considered intruders on
the FCC's master plan and its industry of commercial
TV stations and networks.118 Moreover, the FCC has
reacted, thus far, by carving out a small role for the
'newcomers': they will supplement, but not comt
with the established companies.ll9
Will there be new life from leadership? Can
WHDH's become commonplace? It is unlikely. Through-
out, there has been discussion here concerning the
FCC's failure to escape politics with respect to Con-
gressional and industrial pressure through committees
and lobbying. However, Presidential appointments may
loom large in potential impact. The Republicans now
have a majority of Nixon appointees as Commissioners.
The lack of structured channels of influence may be a
boon for Nixon fans regarding the FCC. The New
Republic predicts:
"The new line-up is good news to the industry,
for it assures them that the FCC will keep
right on defending commercial broadcasters
against consumer challenges to license renew-
als, and will protect the industry.. .against
the technological threat of cable TV and
multi-channel substitutes for the constrain-
ing broadcast system in use today."1 2 0
Despite the leadership factor, whoever it may be, the
only way that the FCC can survive future political
battles, especially with growing, and perhaps spread-
ing, consumer rebellion in other areas, is to lay down
flat rules. It must make clear commitments to its
principles and permit few, if any, exceptions.
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No one has yet fully comprehended or established
precisely what the effect of the media is on the human
mind. Perhaps, nobody ever will. So why should the
public be concerned with broadcasting and its regula-
tor, the FCC, anyway? Who really cares? Somebody
should, and it would be well for broadcasting and
society alike if the people were informed, as Nicholas
Johnson desires, especially since in the average Amer-
ican home, a TV is operating 5-3/4 hours per day; the
average male American, by the age of 65, will have
watched an equivalent of 9 years of TV! Fifty-five
percent of American families change their eating
schedules because of TV, and 60% adjust their sleep
patterns;2 2 .. .this, of course, is not to mention the
additional impact of radio. Thus, there can .e no
escape from the importance of effective regulation of
broadcast communications.
FOOTNOTES
1. Emery, Walter B., Broadcasting and Government:
Responsibilities and Regulations l (1961).
2. Id. at 20.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 30.
5. Id.
6. 5 F. Supp. 848 (S. D. Texas 1934).
7. 326 U.S. 120.
8. Emery, supra at 44.
9. Id. at 45
10. Id.
11. Id. at 47.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 48.
14. Id.
15. Hyneman, Charles S., Bureaucracy in Democracy,
509 (1952).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Sen. Rep. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
19. Id.
20. Emery, supra at 50.
21. Id. at 51.
22. Id. at 52.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 53.
228
229
25. Id.
26. Ray, Verne M., ed., Interpreting FCC Broadcast
Rules and Regulations, 91 (1966).
27. Id.
28. 47 U.S.C. §301
29. Journal Co. v. Fed. Radio Commission, 48 F: 2d
461 (1931).
30. n. 27, supra.
31. Smery, supra at 31.
32. NBC v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 216-17 (1943).
33. Minow, Newton, "The Public Interest", The Crisis
of the Regulatory Commissions, ed. Paul W.
NacAvoy 54 (1970).
34. 47 U.S.C. §309.
35. Emery, supra, at 161.
36. Id.
37. Mansfield Journal v. FCC, 180 F. 2d 28 (1950).
38. Id.
39. Emery, supra at 169.
40. Id. at 172.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Tribune Co, 9 R.R. 719 (1954).
44. 1-inow, supra at 32.
45. Ray, supra at 91.
46. Id. at 95.
47. Id.
48. 47 U.S.C. H311, 313, 314.
49. Ray, sup at 95.
50. Id. at 103.
51. Id. at 104.
52. Stephen R. Rintoul, 11 FCC 108 (1945):
An example: the principal stockholder was
owner of the only daily newspaper in Stam-
ford Conn.; nevertheless, paper was allowed
to run station due to the proximity of many
papers in N.Y.C.
53. Ray, supra at 106.
54. Id. at 107.
55. Emery, supra at 45.
56. Ray, supra at 7.
57. "Activist at the FCC?", 94 Time 22 (Nov. 21, 1969)
58. Ray, supra at 8.
59. Barrow, "Private Interests", The Crisis, ed.
MacAvoy at 70.
60. Kohlmeir, Louis M., The Regulators; Watchdog
Agencies and the Public Interest, 54 (1969).
61. Id. at 61.
62. Id. at 67.
63. Barrow, supra at 74.
64. Emery, sra at 65.
65. 18 U.S.C. §1464 (1965).
66. Emery, supra at 66.
67. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S., 367
(1969).
68. 346 U.S. 89-90 (1953).
69. 47 U.S.C. §315 (1964).
70. Id.
231
71. Ray, supra, at 85
72. 395 U.S. 367.
73. Ray, supra at 74
74. Emery, supra at 240.
75. Id.
76. Ray supra at 8.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 242.
79. Barrow, supra at 73.
80. "The Public Be Damned", 161 New Republic 14 (Sept.
27, 1969).
81. Ray, ur at 114.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. "Signs of Life at the FCC", 160 New Republic 16
(Feb. 22, 1969).
85. Id.
86. "The FCC Creates Some Static", 73 Newsweek 80
Marc. 17, 1969).
87. "FCC: Policy by Whimsy", 208 The Nation 197
(Feb. 17, 1969).
88. Id.
89. 160 New Republic at 17.
90. "Boredorm in Perpetuity?", 161 New Republic 9
(July 5, 1969).
91. "FCC Bares Its Fangs", 73 Newsweek 65 (Feb. 3,
1969).
92. 161 New Republic at 9.
93. Collins, "Freedom Through Responsibility", The
Crisis, ed. MacAvoy, supra at 11.
94. Couse, The Crisis, ed. MacAvoy, supra at 101.
95. Kohlmeir at,70.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Ray at 154.
99. Id.
100. 47 U.S.C. 9404.
101. Ray, supra at 19.
102. Couse, The Crisis, supra at 95.
103. Id. at 98.
104. 161 New Republic at 14.
105. Couse, The Crisis, supra at 99.
106. "Shayon, "Interest in Four-Letter Words", 53
Saturday Review 50 (May 2, 1970).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Jaffe, "The Scandal in TV Licensing", The Poli-
tics of Regulation, eds. Krislov and Musolf, 232
(1964)
110. Kohlmeir, supra at 218.
111. Id.
112. Couse, The Crisis supra at 99.
113. Kohlmeir, supra at 207.
114. Woll, Peter, American Bureaucracy, 9 (1963).
115. Jaffe, supra at 238.
116. 161 New Republic at 9.
117. Id.
118. Kohlmeir, supra at 216.
233
119. Id.
120. 161 New Republic at 14.
121. 160 New Republic at 18.
122. "The FCC Creates Some Static", 73 Newsweek 80
(Mar. 17, 1969).
